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For five decades, Professor Colin Gray’s scholarly writings contributed tremen-
dously to our understanding of strategy, and his wise counsel benefited U.S. 
security policies enormously. His intellectual depth, rigor, curiosity, and wit 
were unparalleled, as were the time, energy, and stamina he devoted to writing 
and lecturing. To say that Colin was prolific is a profound understatement. His 
scholarly published canon includes more than thirty books and three hundred 
articles. He also authored or contributed to scores of unpublished reports for 
various U.S. government offices. To achieve such a record, Colin often would 
work on multiple texts simultaneously. As a consequence, two substantial books 
he authored occasionally would be published in the same year—once, I believe, 
in roughly the same month.1
Equally important, colleagues and students of all views and backgrounds 
greatly enjoyed and appreciated Colin’s unassuming affability and easy charm. 
While frequently involved in the back and forth of strategic policy debates, he 
typically remained a gentleman—reflecting a genuine civility that seems rare to-
day. In one extended press interview, Colin referred to a prominent Washington 
politician in a mildly unflattering way. When the article was published subse-
quently and Colin saw his comment in print, he mailed a personal apology to the 
politician. The latter responded to Colin that he had been called much worse but 
never before had received an apology.
The scope and breadth of Colin’s curiosity and writing far transcended any 
single topic. This brief discussion focuses on only three areas of his enduring 
scholarly interest: deterrence, missile defense, and arms control. To summarize 
the scope and nuance of Colin’s views on strategic deterrence and related issues 
would require a sizable book—which undoubtedly will be written. The much 
more modest goal here, however, is to provide a readable and select synopsis of his 
basic points and positions, which were driven by his philosophical realism and a 
relentless dedication to logic and evidence—wher-
ever that led.
THE INNOVATIVE REALIST
Colin’s work typically was highly innovative, 
and inevitably it provided added value. It may 




Payne: On Deterrence, Defense, and Arms Control—In Honor of Colin S. Gra
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 3 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
be helpful to offer a few select examples of the unique creativity and insight he 
brought to the field of strategic studies. In a 1981 article appearing in the journal 
International Security, Colin essentially introduced the now-thriving study of 
strategic culture as a critical subfield of strategic studies.2 He reintroduced the 
study of geopolitics in a 1977 book, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era, and sub-
sequently authored several innovative texts on the subject, including Maritime 
Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West (1986) and The Geopolitics of 
Super Power (1988).
Colin coined the title “second nuclear age” to identify the post–Cold War 
era—nomenclature that subsequently was adopted internationally. More than 
just a new name, this descriptor reflected his countercultural view that nuclear 
weapons would not lose their salience after the Cold War—that is, the emerging 
era would be different, but nuclear weapons would continue to cast a long shadow 
over international security concerns. Recent history demonstrates that Colin was, 
of course, correct in this regard.
Colin’s books entitled The Second Nuclear Age (1999) and Another Bloody Cen-
tury (2005) presented the harsh realities he deemed more likely than the then-
prevailing near-utopian expectations of great-power comity and a cooperative 
“new world order.” In 1999, for example, Colin dissented from the accepted wis-
dom of the day that terrorism and rogue states were the only remaining threats, 
pointed to “the strong possibility that world politics two to three decades hence 
will be increasingly organized around the rival poles of U.S. and Chinese power,” 
and predicted that China “would menace Japan.” He also then observed that the 
return of Russia as a political-military challenge to the West (which he fully ex-
pected) “immediately would threaten independent Ukraine [and] the Baltics.”3 
Colin expected that the immediate post–Cold War period was a (likely brief) 
interlude before another cycle of sharp great-power competition and potential 
conflict. History demonstrates that Colin again was prescient.
Colin’s contrarian expectations, of course, did not reflect his preferences. 
They followed from his observations and realist philosophical roots, and his cor-
responding view that history provides the best guide for our expectations of the 
future. As noted, his expectations were far removed from the accepted wisdom of 
the day (i.e., that the arising new world order would see the dwindling salience of 
nuclear weapons, and that great-power cooperation and amity would replace cy-
cles of crises and conflict). Colin did not believe that the exhaustion of the Soviet 
Union and the rise of China meant the dawn of a peaceful new age; to the contrary, 
he expected new security challenges to arise and old challenges to return. Again, 
recent history has shown that Colin’s projections were correct, if unfashionable.
Beginning in the 1970s, Colin’s work played an increasingly significant role in 
the evolution of U.S. thinking, particularly within the Department of Defense. 
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Very few scholars have affected U.S. policies so directly. When Secretary of De-
fense James N. Mattis introduced the 2018 National Defense Strategy, he quoted 
Colin and referred to him as “the most near-faultless strategist alive today,” and 
Colin is the only academic with highlighted quotes in both the 2018 Nuclear 
Posture Review and the 2019 Missile Defense Review.4
THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE
An overarching theme and goal of Colin’s writings and lectures was identifying 
the most effective approach to deterring war, particularly nuclear war—that is, 
war prevention. He also recognized the possibility that deterrence could fail 
and nuclear war could ensue despite the best preventive efforts. Correspond-
ingly, he reasoned that because nuclear war is possible, the United States should 
think prudently through “what to do” in the event. He considered an officially 
declared U.S. response of the 1960s and early 1970s—including a large-scale 
nuclear strike against Soviet society—to be complete, immoral folly and a faulty 
guide for measuring the adequacy of U.S. nuclear forces. His basic proposition 
was simple but not simplistic: the West must seek unceasingly to deter war. 
Colin had no confidence in the notion that nuclear employment, once initi-
ated, would remain limited or that nuclear war could serve a political goal.5 
But, if deterrence failed nevertheless and war ensued, U.S. actions should not 
be impromptu by default or a spasmodic nuclear response that consciously 
abandoned any purposeful goal beyond revenge and societal destruction. 
Rather, they should be guided by thoughtful planning to deter further nuclear 
escalation and minimize societal destruction to the extent feasible—with full 
recognition that, while neither goal was certain, rejecting measures that might 
help limit escalation and destruction would be grossly irresponsible. That is 
hardly a radical proposition.6
But openly discussing what to do if deterrence fails was outside the norms of 
most academic discourse. Doing so was then and continues to be criticized as 
reflecting a sympathy for “nuclear war fighting” as opposed to deterrence. Colin 
ran afoul of the reigning wisdom that the “stable” balance of terror, properly 
tended, would not fail short of irrationality, and that nuclear war was “unthink-
able”—and certainly not to be discussed publicly, other than by some, occasion-
ally, as a political tool for rousing popular opposition to U.S. nuclear arms. But 
that was not Colin’s purpose.
Because Colin pointed to the need to plan as prudently as possible for deter-
rence failure and his publications occasionally included the word victory (in one 
case, in an article’s provocative title created without the authors’ permission, or 
even knowledge), some critics asserted that his goal was not deterrence but rather 
planning to fight and win a nuclear war. This is a wholly mistaken interpretation 
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of his work and intent, including his occasional use of the word victory. As noted, 
he was highly skeptical of any notion that the employment of nuclear weapons 
would remain limited and thus could serve a political goal. Indeed, he viewed 
nuclear war as a potentially unparalleled horror to be prevented, if possible, 
through diplomacy and deterrence. These were the goals of his scholarship on the 
subject. In at least some cases the mischaracterization of his work as sympathetic 
to nuclear war fighting obviously was contrived for the purpose of creating a 
provocative nuclear straw man against which to argue.
In short, Colin’s highest scholarly priority was to understand how best to pre-
vent nuclear war, and he was convinced that seeking to think through the ques-
tion of what to do in the event of deterrence failure both was prudent and could 
improve the prospects for deterring war. There was no trade-off.
ARMS CONTROL: A “HOUSE OF CARDS”
A prominent academic argument of the 1960s and 1970s was that the U.S.-Soviet 
nuclear arms race of the time was a result of “action-reaction” cycles initiated by 
the United States. Critics of U.S. nuclear forces typically argued that it was the 
United States that instigated and propelled the U.S.-Soviet arms race, because 
U.S. deployment of nuclear arms (the initial “action”) compelled the Soviet 
Union to respond with a nuclear buildup (the inevitable “reaction”). This U.S.-led 
action-reaction dynamic supposedly explained the U.S.-Soviet arms race.7
The policy argument that accompanied this action-reaction thesis, of course, 
was that if only the United States would cease or curtail its nuclear-weapons pro-
grams, the Soviet Union could and would do likewise. Consequently, ending the 
arms race was a U.S. opportunity and responsibility; if the United States curtailed 
its nuclear armaments, the action-reaction arms-race dynamic would be replaced 
by a U.S.-led inaction-inaction dynamic—bringing the arms race to a close. 
However, if the United States continued to pursue nuclear programs, it would 
continue to propel the arms race as well. This prevalent argument posited an 
arms race continually led by the United States and its “first moves”—opponents 
being reactive and largely benign cogs in this mechanistic process. The same 
action-reaction contention, with U.S. culpability, has been on display since the 
1960s and remains prominent in contemporary arguments against U.S. nuclear 
arms and missile defense.
One of the earliest targets of Colin’s demand for logic and evidence was this 
fashionable, U.S.-led, action-reaction/inaction-inaction thesis. His 1976 book 
The Soviet-American Arms Race demolished this reductionist explanation of the 
arms race, along with the corresponding assertion that U.S. inaction would pro-
duce Soviet inaction—that is, a “peace race.”8 He argued instead from evidence 
that a variety of interactive and noninteractive behaviors and motivations, not 
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the action-reaction dynamic, explained U.S. and Soviet nuclear-arms programs. 
The bottom line of Colin’s work was that policies derived from the politically 
powerful action-reaction thesis—that U.S. actions drove the arms race and U.S. 
inaction would lead to Soviet inaction and an end to the arms race—were sure 
to be frustrated, because the Soviet Union’s motives for its nuclear arms were far 
more complex than the reductionist action-reaction thesis. Multiple later seri-
ous studies came to the same conclusion.9 In 1979, the Carter administration’s 
Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, very publicly dismissed the action-reaction 
thesis, noting that the Soviet Union “has shown no restraint—when we build, 
they build, when we cut, they build.”10
Colin continued to challenge pervasive, fawning academic and government 
expressions regarding nuclear-arms control. The title of his most comprehen-
sive book on the subject, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (1992), 
clearly signaled his conclusion, as do the titles of chapters 1 and 7, “The Magi-
cal Kingdom of Arms Control” and “To Bury Arms Control, Not to Praise It,” 
respectively. On the basis of nearly a century of arms-control history (e.g., the 
extensive arms-control record of the 1920s and 1930s and the U.S.-Soviet SALT/
START experience), he challenged the central, widely accepted claims for the 
U.S.-Soviet strategic arms-control process: that it could move the superpowers’ 
strategic doctrines and force postures in mutually benign directions, and that the 
dialogue on nuclear arms itself could be the dynamic for the transformation of 
U.S.-Soviet relations away from hostility.
In stark contrast, Colin essentially explained that the character of political 
relations among countries and their respective “strategic cultures” drive their 
armament programs, and correspondingly the possibilities of arms control, and 
that those political relations and cultures typically reflect both centuries of his-
torical experience and contemporary issues. They ultimately govern countries’ 
armaments incentives and goals and set the boundaries for arms control. “The 
political antagonism that generates the objective need for alleviation via arms 
control—always assuming, again fallaciously, that arms control could control—is 
the very reason why arms control must fail.”11 The fundamental resolution of 
hostile political relations could lead naturally to significant relaxation of military 
requirements and to arms control, but the reverse is not true. And, of course, if 
previously hostile relations have become truly cordial, arms-control agreements 
lose much of their significance.
Colin’s conclusion—that, despite all the fanfare and attention, the arms- 
control process is incapable of transformative effects among hostile states because 
it is limited by their hostility—again was wholly contrarian. However, given the 
Cold War history of actual arms-control practice, his general conclusion increas-
ingly became mainstream. Secretary Brown recognized the same nexus: “The 
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[U.S.-Soviet] political relationship drove the success or failure of arms control 
much more than the other way around.”12
From this foundation, Colin concluded that arms control “is either impos-
sible or unimportant.” He referred to this as the “arms control paradox” and, 
calling on historical evidence, demonstrated how it was reflected in “virtually 
all twentieth-century experience with arms control or its absence.”13 Indeed, 
the U.S. strategic arms-control aspiration to move Russian nuclear arms toward 
“stability” (as understood in the West) largely was frustrated until political rela-
tions improved dramatically with the collapse of the Soviet Union—which had 
little or nothing to do with the arms-control process.14 Since then that aspiration 
has been frustrated, once again, with the return of stridently hostile U.S.-Russian 
political relations.
ON DETERRENCE
In 1960, Herman Kahn observed the following about U.S. deterrence: “In spite 
of our reliance on the idea that deterrence will work, we usually do not analyze 
carefully the basic concepts behind such a policy.”15 But Colin did just that, 
methodically identifying the logical contradictions and lack of evidence behind 
accepted wisdom and fashionable Cold War thinking about nuclear deterrence. 
When he began publishing on strategic deterrence and nuclear policy in the early 
1970s, he was highly critical of most U.S. government expressions and academic 
commentary on the subject. By the 1980s, however, U.S. policies, on a bipartisan 
basis, had come to reflect much of Colin’s earlier thought.
Many of Colin’s basic points about strategic deterrence and missile defense 
built on Kahn’s writings from the 1960s, particularly the latter’s On Thermo-
nuclear War and Thinking about the Unthinkable. These two remarkable scholars 
often reached the same conclusions, but their routes differed. Whereas Kahn’s 
work manifestly was that of a physicist addressing issues of international politics 
and power, Colin’s approach to the same subjects came from political science, 
military history, and anthropology. Indeed, he focused on how the unique his-
tory, culture, and political context of nations could drive considerable variation in 
different leaderships’ decision-making pertinent to the functioning of deterrence. 
And, perhaps because of his British origins, he focused on America’s extended 
deterrence relationship with allies.
Colin’s views on deterrence challenged conventional wisdom. He dismissed 
notions widely accepted in the West that a reliably “stable balance of terror” could 
be expected, given the Soviet adoption of U.S. views regarding nuclear weapons 
(i.e., “convergence”). Because Soviet calculations generally were believed to mir-
ror those of U.S. leaders, Soviet behavior was expected to follow familiar pat-
terns, and deterrence therefore was expected to play out predictably and reliably. 
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This assumption regarding the predictability of Soviet behavior led some senior 
figures in U.S. national security to conclude that mutual nuclear deterrence was 
so stable that it functioned nearly automatically (i.e., “existential deterrence”). 
“The terrible and unavoidable uncertainties in any recourse to nuclear war create 
what could be called ‘existential’ deterrence, where the function of the adjective 
is to distinguish this phenomenon from anything based on strategic theories or 
declared policies. . . . As long as each side has thermonuclear weapons that could 
be used against the opponent, even after the strongest possible preemptive attack 
[a “second-strike capability”], existential deterrence is strong.”16
Colin considered such notions of a balance of terror built on “mirror imaging” 
to be a lamentable reflection of enduring traits of the American elite’s strategic 
culture: tenacious groupthink and a “trait of machine-mindedness” that reduces 
“the difficulties created by politics and opposed national policies to problems of 
administration, management, and engineering.”17 He expanded on Kahn’s and 
Albert J. Wohlstetter’s general contention that deterrence should not be expected 
to function easily, reliably, and predictably. In 1958, Wohlstetter famously de-
scribed the balance of terror as “fragile.”18 Colin concurred and emphasized that 
an assumption of much Western Cold War thinking about deterrence “stabil-
ity”—that Soviet and U.S. leaders perceived and calculated deterrence and the 
balance of terror similarly—very likely was dangerously mistaken.
On the basis of his reading of available historical evidence, Colin rejected this 
key presumption of similar U.S. and Soviet deterrence perceptions and calcula-
tions. He concluded instead that “assessments of deterrence stability err because 
they do not take into account” differences in political will.19 For example, the 
great differences distinguishing U.S. and Soviet strategic cultures would render 
Soviet decision-making and the functioning of deterrence unpredictable: “Sen-
sitivity to human loss has not been a prominent feature of Soviet (or Russian) 
political culture. Anyone who believes that nuclear war should mean the same to 
Americans and to Great Russians should reflect deeply on the contrasting histo-
ries of the two societies.” Thus, “there is massive uncertainty over ‘what deters’ 
(who? on what issue? when?).”20
In short, given the potential for variation often witnessed in political-military 
history, Colin rejected the comforting and convenient mirror imaging that 
undergirded expectations of a reliably stable balance of terror and existential 
deterrence. He insisted that there is no relevant universal definition of rational 
behavior, no nondescript countries A and B, and no Homo strategicus leadership 
making predictably sensible decisions. Rather, leaderships with a wide range of 
strategic cultures, perceptions, beliefs, goals, and passions can arrive at very dif-
ferent conclusions about what constitutes the most sensible deterrence-related 
decision-making and behavior. Consequently, Colin emphasized—decades 
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before the point would become widely accepted as pertinent to U.S. deterrence 
policy—that the great variation in national histories, perceptions, cultures, goals, 
values, and so on likely will impact decision-making and behavior in unexpected 
ways and render the functioning of deterrence inherently uncertain.
Some U.S. leaders during the Cold War expected the strategic arms-control 
process to provide the opportunity to bring Soviet thinking in line with U.S. 
balance-of-terror thought—that is, into the “real world” of nuclear weapons and 
the inevitable logic of a stable balance of terror.21 If necessary, American tutorials 
on deterrence could “educate” the Soviet political and military leadership into 
“convergence” with U.S. thinking. Colin dismissed this notion as ethnocentric 
folly, given the tremendous differences in the American and Russian histories, 
perceptions, goals, and strategic cultures.22
Colin rebelled against the comforting notions that the balance of terror could 
be made predictably stable and that strategic forces could be delineated neatly as 
“stabilizing” or “destabilizing,” according to formula. His willingness to express 
this view, along with considering what to do if deterrence fails, was viewed as 
heretical by most of the nuclear deterrence “priesthood” of the time—as indeed it 
was. Doing so challenged the most cherished presumptions regarding the domi-
nant balance-of-terror deterrence formula: that it would be predictably stable as 
long as the contenders played according to the rules of stability—which, by defi-
nition, they ultimately would do, because they were presumed to be comparably 
sensible (per American sensibilities) and convergence would align Soviet views 
with American logic.
Colin’s rejection of this fundamental presumption of reigning deterrence 
theory significantly shaped his views about deterrence policy and strategic de-
fenses. For example, he insisted that deterrence policy must be adjusted to take 
into account the variability in an opponent’s perceptions, tolerances, values, and 
goals—that is, deterrence planning must be done “with reference to the unique 
details of the case in hand.”23 Correspondingly, he often explained that no such 
thing as “the deterrent” exists, because no single approach or narrowly defined 
force structure can be expected to deter. Rather, Colin concluded that U.S. deter-
rence planning and forces must be flexible and diverse to deter as effectively as 
possible, given the great variations possible among opponents and contexts. His 
iconoclastic views in this regard preceded by more than a decade their wholesale, 
bipartisan acceptance—as is reflected in numerous contemporary open U.S. poli-
cy documents and the now-ubiquitous observation by civilian and military lead-
ers that deterrence must be “tailored” to opponents because no “one size fits all.”
Colin was not iconoclastic by nature; it was not a role to which he aspired or 
seemed to enjoy. Rather, the inadequacies he saw in the dominant strategic think-
ing of the mid–Cold War period left him little choice but to accept the role. By 
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1980, however, the general outlines of U.S. strategic policy, including President 
Carter’s “countervailing strategy,” were moving considerably closer to the posi-
tions Colin had articulated.
Finally, Colin did not prefer that the United States and the West rely on nuclear 
deterrence for their security. He fully recognized its dangers. In fact, he believed 
reliance on nuclear deterrence to be “foolish” if there were a realistic alternative.24 
However, in line with realism, he foresaw no plausible alternative: “There is no 
alternative, benign international political system. . . . Any rational person, one 
might think, should be able to design a very much more reasonable and safer 
global security system than we have today. I suspect that this is true but, alas, 
entirely beside the historical point. Our current security and insecurity context is 
the unplanned, certainly unintended, product of centuries of political history.”25
ON STRATEGIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Colin’s conclusion that the functioning of deterrence is inherently uncertain and 
unpredictable also was key to his position regarding U.S. strategic defensive ca-
pabilities (i.e., homeland defense). He was well aware that limiting damage might 
not be feasible in many possible nuclear scenarios, but believed that it could be 
in others. Correspondingly, in contrast to basic balance-of-terror desiderata, 
he considered irresponsible a policy by which the U.S. government consciously 
would choose to forgo protecting society where possible. Such a policy contrib-
uted to the potential for unmitigated destruction should deterrence fail. “Nuclear 
war is possible, and the U.S. government owes it to generations of Americans—
past, present, and future—to make prudent defense preparations to limit damage 
to domestic American values to the extent feasible in the event of nuclear war.”26
Consequently, Colin emphasized that missile defense to limit the potential 
for societal destruction should be a policy priority, not anathema. This emphasis 
went fully against the grain of Western deterrence thinking that unmitigated mu-
tual vulnerability is stabilizing and should be preserved and codified. From the 
American perspective, the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
served precisely this purpose by limiting strategic-missile-defense development 
and deployment significantly.
Colin’s support for strategic missile defense, however, was a logical extension 
of his basic points.
1. Given the variability in decision-making, deterrence is uncertain and can 
fail.
2. The United States should consider prudently what to do in the event of 
deterrence failure.
3. In the event of war, society should be defended to the extent feasible.
9
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Colin’s support for strategic missile defense also followed from his attention 
to U.S. extended deterrence for allies. He contended that unmitigated U.S. so-
cietal vulnerability to attack undermined the credibility of America’s extended-
deterrent threat on behalf of allies. In fact, he believed that the credibility of 
U.S. extended deterrence “is very low so long as the United States makes no 
noteworthy provision for the protection of its homeland against inevitable So-
viet retaliation.”27 His logic was clear: the Soviet Union was not likely to believe 
America’s extended-deterrent threat to employ nuclear weapons on behalf of 
allies if it could not survive the certain Soviet retaliation. He feared that an unbe-
lievable extended deterrent provided little or no protection for allies and instead 
might encourage Russian aggression.
Consequently, Colin advanced two basic reasons for U.S. strategic missile 
defense: to protect American society in the event deterrence fails, to the ex-
tent possible; and to provide credibility for U.S. extended-deterrent commit-
ments to allies. He did not believe that strategic defense was likely to provide 
flawless protection against a determined nuclear attack, but argued that even 
plausible imperfect defense capabilities could strengthen the credibility of 
extended deterrence and save lives that otherwise would be lost in the event 
of deterrence failure. He consistently endorsed U.S. strategic missile defense 
for these reasons.28
For a time, Colin was fairly isolated in his views on strategic missile defense. 
They were wholly contrary to the intent and purpose of the ABM Treaty, which 
received overwhelming support in the U.S. Senate and in general. However, once 
again U.S. policy, on a bipartisan basis, eventually caught up with much of Colin’s 
thinking. In 2002, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty for the pur-
pose of deploying strategic missile defense to protect the U.S. homeland against 
the limited strategic-missile threats that rogue states could pose.29 U.S. policy had 
come to recognize that missile defense that would not be effective against a great 
power’s attack still could have great value. In 2010, the Obama administration 
listed as first priority defending “the homeland against the threat of limited ballis-
tic missile attack.”30 This policy priority attributed to strategic missile defense by 
the Obama administration is repeated in the Department of Defense’s 2019 Mis-
sile Defense Review, along with a discussion of its value for deterrence purposes.31 
The Missile Defense Review also includes the following quote from Colin: “U.S. 
missile defence can critically reduce an attacker’s confidence in the prospects 
for success in its offensive strike planning. Given the inherent and irreducible 
uncertainties of war that should fuel doubt in such plans, the additional uncer-
tainty imposed by U.S. missile defence should prove decisively deterring in the 
attacker’s calculations.”32 Colin’s thoughts on strategic missile defense remained 
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consistent over five decades, and U.S. policy largely, if not entirely, has caught up 
on a bipartisan basis.
A review of Colin Gray’s work reveals how easily he moved simultaneously within 
the two very different and often mutually exclusive worlds of academia and gov-
ernment policy. His scholarship, over time, contributed to the betterment of U.S. 
policy in a number of areas, but nowhere more than in the seemingly arcane and 
incredibly consequential arenas of deterrence, defense, and arms control. His 
scholarly writings helped move U.S. arms-control policy away from its reduc-
tionist action-reaction roots, deterrence policy away from its mechanical mirror 
imaging, and missile defense policy toward recognition of the value of strategic 
defense. Colin’s ideas and writings were his currency for these developments. He 
was an adviser who spoke truth to power with humility and great effect, despite 
the harsh criticism he often received for doing so at the time—criticism he typi-
cally endured with humor and good grace. It is no overstatement to conclude that 
the West is a safer place for his remarkable scholarship and tenacity.
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